Foto: Inquam Photos / Laszlo Beliczay
Prin tot ceea ce face și prin tot ceea ce declară, Viktor Orban este un antimaghiar patent. Abordând problema rasială, a purității rasiale a popoarelor europene, dar mai ales a poporului maghiar, asediate de emigrația unor populații din Asia și Africa, cel ce se bagă întotdeauna în seamă, anume „providențialul” premier al Ungariei, se află într-o năucitoare contradicție cu propria etnie. Mai exact, acesta se face că nu știe că națiunea maghiară este cu predilecție un amestec de etnii (slovaci, croați, sârbi, români, germani, polonezi și mai ales evrei), o națiune care s-a constituit mai întâi ca națiune culturală și care, prin procesul de asimilare și de maghiarizare a acestor etnii devenit politică de stat („vagy magyarositunk vagy nem leszünk”, adică „ori maghiarizăm, ori nu vom fi” ), a devenit o mândră națiune etnică. Viktor Orban se prăbușește, așadar, în propria superbie și îmbățoșare, încercând să devină un apostol al națiunilor europene în puritatea lor necontaminată rasial de imigranți din Asia și Africa. Tot el se prăbușește în propria ignoranță făcând abstracție de faptul că maghiarii sunt un popor venit în Panonia, în secolele IX-X, din spații de la marginea Europei.
A doua mare prăbușire a lui Viktor Orban petrecută la întâlnirea de la Tușnad, unde a fost aplaudat de o mulțime de ignoranți și amnezici, seduși de perfidia dezvoltatorului imobiliar de ... stadioane, este evidențiată de putinismul lui care este contra naturii poporului și națiunii maghiare. Altfel spus, maghiarii, prin revoluția anti-sovietică din 1956, și-au demonstrat ura viscerală față de ruși care i-au masacrat, înroșind apele Dunării din Budapesta în acel an revoluționar. Cât de nedemni pot fi cei care l-au susținut și l-au aplaudat! Oare liderii UDMR pro-europeni și pro-NATO nu l-au tras de mânecă la auzul acestor declarații rasiale și evident antieuropene și pro-rusești? La Tușnad, el a fost talonat în verbiajul lui infantil și nestăpânit de celebrul L. Tokes, un tip fanat, expirat și anemiat de încrâncenarea sa radicală, dar care, în timpul Revoluției Române din 1989, a fost indirect și perfid utilizat de securitatea virată total spre KGB.
Un bărbat este escortat în afara universității de Vară "Tusvanyos", la Băile Tușnad, în Harghita, după ce a afisat un banner cu textul "Ceva este etern: Translivania, pământ românesc!", sâmbătă, 23 iulie 2022. Foto: Inquam Photos / Laszlo Beliczay
Iată, așadar, cum se întâlnesc în datele acelorași simpatii și afinități pro-rusești din trecut și de astăzi cei doi corifei antimaghiari. A nu le da importanță acestor trepăduși politici este cel mai mare afront pe care îl putem aduce. Este definitiv dezonorantă și dizgrațioasă această atitudine antimaghiară.
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1. <<As conquerors the Magyars had entered the Danubian valley and as conquerors they remained, haughtily lording it over the subjugated. rather like the Chinese, the Magyars believed that the rest of humanity possessed little that had value; for "foreigners" their contempt was boundless, as is illustrated by the adage, "Extra Hungariam non est vita, et si est vita, non est ita" (Outside of Hungary nothing exists, or if anything does exist, it is not comparable with what we have).>>
2. <<These Hungarians, who had arrived from Central Asia in the ninth century, were a unique racial islet, speaking a unique language, Magyar. Their existence was defined by fear: the fear of being mastered by the Germans or swallowed up by the Slavs. This gave the Hungarians a bullying spirit, a determination to “Magyarize” everyone around them in order to augment their own small numbers and nip ethnic competition in the bud.>>
3. <<[Lajos] Kossuth’s attitude [in 1849], which was without doubt approved by most Hungarian political leaders, was a combination of unrealistic benevolence and national intolerance. The non-Hungarians were culturally inferior, and must be so treated: it was intolerable that they should have the status of equality with the ruling Hungarian nation. However, they need have no grounds for discontent, for as Hungarian citizens they would enjoy all liberties, and every effort would be made to transform them into Hungarians, after which all would be well with them. Kossuth and his friends genuinely believed that they were doing the non-Hungarians a kindness by giving them the chance of becoming absorbed in the superior Hungarian culture. To refuse this kindness was nationalist fanaticism: to impose it by force was to promote progress. The suggestion that Romanians, Slovaks or Serbs were nations, with a national culture of their own, was simply ridiculous nonsense. Later in life, in his long exile in Western Europe,
Kossuth recognized that he had been wrong, and devised various schemes for federation in Central Europe which had no chance of being carried out. In his own country, his national intolerance remained accepted doctrine.>>
4. <<Nations other than the Austrians and Hungarians regarded the Ausgleich of 1867 as a cynical deal struck between the two state-nations of the ‘Dual Monarchy’ (together comprising some 43 per cent of the total state population) for the joint suppression of the remainder of the multi-national populace. Within Hungary, early promises to respect the rights of the non-Magyar 58.8 per cent of the population (in 1880), notably by a Nationalities Law in 1868, were soon abandoned in favour of a sustained programme of magyarisation. (...) The Hungarian language was foisted on the nonMagyar majority through advancing state control of the school and university systems. Non-Magyar representation in the Hungarian Diet at Budapest was filtered at parliamentary elections to derisory and tokenistic levels. Demographically a miniempire in which the Magyars could never even (quite) muster a majority, Hungary claimed the Magyarsag or ‘Magyar-land’ as a Hungarian nation-state.
It is important to consider why the Hungarians should adopt magyarisation with such relish. Neither the spirit nor the policy of magyarisation was born in the 1880s: Hungarian contempt for the smaller nationalities unfortunate enough to find themselves within Hungarian jurisdiction had been legendary for centuries and had contributed to the isolation and subsequent defeat of the Hungarian national cause in 1849. Fundamentally, the historical career of the Hungarian people predisposed them psychologically towards what might be tritely called ‘insecurity-based aggression’. A pervasive sense of racial and linguistic isolation combined with a conviction that their resentful Germanic, Slavonic and even Latin neighbours were waiting for an opportunity to turn back the clock of history and expel the Magyars from their unlawfully seized real-estate back to the Asia from which they had swept in the ninth century. Indeed, the whole history of the Hungarians could be seen as a sequence of traumatic oscillation between possession, dispossession and repossession, most recently over
the 1848–1867 period. A collective, almost genetically imprinted sense of insecurity pre-determined a pathological siege mentality which supported the magyarisation to which the supremacist establishment of Hungary committed itself from the 1880s.>>
5. <<No Hungarian regime ever thought of Hungary except in terms of Magyar supremacy; they differed only in their views of how far down it was necessary to go with the process of Magyarization, and in the degree of vigour and purpose with which they pursued the aim. (...) The conduct of administration and justice were Magyarized, down to the lowest level, not only in all internal transactions, but, largely, in the outer services: notices to the public, even in purely non-Magyar districts, were in Magyar only, as were all proceedings in the Courts; a defendant could employ an interpreter, but had to pay for his services. The Magyar national culture was treated as the only one deserving respect, or even legitimate, in Hungary; the others were, at best, tolerated contemptuously, but attempts to cultivate them, above the humblest level, even where specifically authorized by the Nationalities Law, were regarded as potentially or actually treasonable; always discouraged, and whenever a quarter-plausible excuse could be thought up, forbidden. The smear of treason attached even more to any attempt to give political expression to the philosophical assumption of the Law itself: the possibility of a Hungarian patriotism not identified with Magyarism. (...) For the extremists, the only ultimately satisfactory solution was, as it had been in the 1840s, that the country should become entirely Magyar.>>
6. << Once the Dual Monarchy was set up, signifying Hungary's total victory over the centralizing Germans of Vienna, the Hungarians did everything in their power (...) to strengthen the rule of the German liberals over the other half of the Empire. Not content with ruling over their own minority races with a perfect disregard for nationalistic aspirations, they encouraged the German centralizers, against whom they had latterly fought with such bitterness and passion, with such an exuberance and luxuriance of invocation of the sacred rights of national independence, to sit on the Slavs of Cisleithania. They did this because they believed, correctly, that any concessions made by Vienna to the subject-nations in her half of the Monarchy might produce demands for similar concessions from their own subjects. As in 1848, the Magyars showed in 1864, and thereafter until the final collapse of the Empire, that they were not in the least interested in the principles of self-determination for small nations, but only in winning and maintaining dominion for themselves. It was this total lack of principle behind the Magyar agitation, conducted to the accompaniment of the highest sounding invocations of the rights of man, which tarnished their romantic patriotism and introduced into their politics an element of the disreputable, preventing them from being at any time a force for goodness and enlightenment. Clearly freedom, like charity, begins at home; clearly a small nation struggling to preserve its own identity will put first things first, i.e. itself. But it is hard to discover in the history of modern Europe any nation which has exhibited such sustained and unmitigated egocentricity as the Hungarian nation, any nation which at no time in a century of rapid change ever showed the faintest, the most embryonic, flicker of interest in anything at all but its own immediately selfish interests. (...) And, in the end, it was Magyar chauvinism more than anything else which made the Habsburg Empire unworkable and precipitated its final undoing.>>
7. <<We have only one single categorical imperative, the Magyar state-idea, and we must demand that every citizen should acknowledge it and subject himself unconditionally to it. From this point of view we, all politicians of Hungary, are intransigent... I shall tell why. Because Hungary has its age-old, and legitimate rights to strengthen the idea of such a state. The Magyars have conquered this country for the Magyars and not for others. The supremacy and the hegemony of the Magyars is fully justified.>>
Contele Kálmán Széll (1843-1915), prim-ministru al Ungariei intre 1889 si 1903.
<<"Every idea, every aspiration to hinder Magyarization and to spread other languages besides the Magyar would signify the undermining of the intelligentsia, of the constitutional principles, nay of Protestantism itself. The Magyar language is the staunchest defender of liberty and Protestantism in our country. The victory of the Magyars is at the same time the victory of Liberty and Reason. The Magyarization of the Slavs is the holiest duty of any true Hungarian patriot, of any fighter for Liberty and Reason, and of any loyal subject of the Habsburg dynasty.>>
Contele Károly Zay (1797 - 1871), inspector general al Regatului Maghiar pentru bisericile luterane si scolile slovace intre 1840-1849.
8. <<One of the most astounding traits of Hungarian history, subsequently suppressed or flatly denied by nationalistic chroniclers, is that the makers of the national myths, the widely acclaimed heroes of the Ottoman wars, the political and military leaders of the War of Independence against the Habsburgs, the outstanding figures of literature and science, were totally or partly of German, Croat, Slovak, Romanian or Serb origin. Considering that at the time of Emperor Joseph II Magyars formed merely one-third of Hungary’s population, but that this had increased by 1910 to 54.5 per cent, the dynamic of linguistic and political assimilation by old Hungary was extraordinary. According to statistical estimates the number of Germans regarding themselves as Hungarian exceeded 600,000, of assimilated Slovaks more than half a million, and of Jews who had become Magyars some 700,000. It has been estimated that already before the First World War the proportion of assimilated Germans, Slavs and Jews made up more than a quarter of statistically established Magyardom.>>
9. <<Since the Ausgleich, everything has favoured the Magyars — their strong central position in the country; their league with the dominant German party in Austria; the approval of the Polish aristocracy in Galicia ; the favour of the Court and the support of Bismarck and the Triple Alliance; and, last but not least, the active adherence of the Jews and international Finance. But the suddenness with which complete success followed apparent ruin, seems to have destroyed all sense of proportion in the Magyars: and today it is part of every Magyar's political creed that the non-Magyar races are mere "foreigners," who must be assimilated as rapidly as possible. Undeterred by the manifest impossibility of six million human beings assimilating other seven million, the Magyars have pursued the phantom of a "national Magyar state," and have employed every means in their power to crush out the resistance of the other races to what they regard as their "superior culture." The natural result has been that they find themselves to-day, at a critical moment of their history, ringed round by hostile races, whom the bitter memory of past wrongs renders adverse to compromise.>>
10. <<Around 1900 Hungarian triumphalism was such that several well-known commentators thought that a Hungary of 30 million souls could dominate the Balkans as in the time of the late medieval king János Hunyádi, who held off the Turks. Before 1914, in that era of nationalist euphoria, as Hungarians contemplated their superb capital, the historic recovery of the Lands of the Crown of St Stephen, from their Adriatic port of Fiume almost to the Black Sea, and the cultural effusion that had put them once again well and truly on the European intellectual map, the delusions piled up.(...) In Budapest the chief editor of a main newspaper, Jenő Rákosi, said in 1902 that soon there would be 30 million Hungarians dominating south-eastern Europe as in medieval days of yore. The chief thinker of the governing party, Gusztáv Beksics, thought the number too high but the effect the same. A best-selling book, Greater Hungary (by Pál Hoitsy, otherwise a decent astronomer), dispensed the reader from reading any more than the title, and there were serious suggestions that the Habsburg Monarchy should be renamed ‘Hungary-Austria’. >>
11. <<“Our non-Magyar fellow citizens must first of all reconcile themselves to the fact that they belong to a national state which is not a conglomerate of different races, but which one nation has conquered and founded, upon which one nation has stamped the ineradicable impress of its individuality”.
Istvan Tisza, prim-ministru al Ungariei, discurs in parlamentul de la Budapest, 1910.
<< During the winter of 1913-194, [Istvan Tisza] held a series of private conferences with representatives of the Rumanian National Party who had no hesitancy in listing their grievances and asking for appeasing concessions. Their demands included the use of Romanian tongue in schools attended by Rumanians, the appointment of judges in Rumanian districts who spoke the local language, greater freedom of the press and assembly (…).
For all his well-known antipathy toward Rumanians, Tisza is said to have admitted the justice of certain of these demands, yet he felt (or said he felt) that Magyar politicians could not be brought around to make concessions. The nub of the matter was that Magyar chauvinists, stubborn, arrogant, prejudiced, looked upon the Romanians, as indeed upon other minority stocks, as an inferior breed of humanity, whom it was a tradition to despise and a duty to Magyarize. By refusing to exert his great personal prestige to persuade his fellows to satisfy Rumanian expectations, at least in part, Tisza muffed an opportunity for which he, his Hungary, and the Dual Monarchy would one day pay the penalty.>>
12. <<The Hungarian system of civic training (…) the whole public education, press, and cultural activity of the social associations described and portrayed the history of the Magyar state as a unique effort for national independence and solidarity under the exclusive leadership of the Magyar nobility. (…) The whole history of the country was set forth as a history of national enthusiasm against the devilish plans of Habsburg centralization and the even more devilish plots of Rumanians and the Slavs, who in spite of the unheard magnanimity of the Magyars, made common cause with the Austrian aggressors. (…)
The non-Magyar peoples (...) were always portrayed as of an inferior culture and as enemies of the Magyars who made common case with the Habsburgs from sheer malevolence, envy, and hatred of the Magyars. The psychological cause of this attitude was never explained to the [Magyar] students, at best the fact was alluded to that, as they were formerly conquered by the Magyars when the state was created, later they tried to avenge themselves against their rightful masters. (…) The Compromise of 1867 was glorified as the work of the “sage of the nation” and described as giving total independence to the country and guaranteeing the supremacy of the Magyars over the nationalities. But never was reasonably elucidated what was the part of the Magyars in the Constitutions, what were their duties and obligations toward the other nations of the monarchy. On the contrary, the illusion was fostered that Hungary was an entirely independent, free, and self-sufficient country which could do what it liked. The other nations of the Monarchy, the Germans themselves, were disregarded as mute and insignificant partners of the Magyar epic. A kind of romantic symbolism permeated all instruction. The Magyar nation became the innocent poor fellow of the popular tales who was attacked on every side by malignant enemies, but he, by his incredible courage, was always victorious over the treacherous assailants. (…) Generally speaking, the whole elementary and secondary education was characterized by the fact that the child’s face was turned backward, he could look only upon the past. He could never see himself in his relation to the present. And this past was an artificially constructed picture in the center of which stood the heroic Magyar nation, surrounded by few friends and many enemies. No wonder therefore, that the student graduated from high school, did not know anything concerning the real cultural and economic forces of his country and the opposite historical traditions of the various other nations. (…)
The non-Magyar nations were regarded as peoples without history, having no special mission, the Magyarization of which could be the only possible issue on the long run. All the [Magyar] festivals, literary and social associations fostered the same spirit. The chivalrous Magyar nation was terribly abused by its pernicious enemies, both the [Habsburg] dynasty and the nationalities, but the time is near when it will recover its former glory (…). All the moral and financial forces of civic education were concentrated towards this ideal, which represented the most sincere and serious conviction of the Magyar society and of the leading educational staff. For three generations Magyar public opinion, almost without any counterbalance, regarded the history of the country and of the whole world through this distorted perspective. (…) In spite of the inherent fallacies of this system of civic education, it seemed for a long period to be efficient and victorious, especially in the big cities and in all those circles where Magyar economic, cultural, and political life was sufficiently intensive. Magyar public opinion was under the mirage of this optical illusion, disregarding the fact that in the rural districts and in the small towns many millions of non-Magyar nationalities were untouched by this trend of exuberant patriotism.>>
Sursele:
1. Arthur J. May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1918, Norton Library / Harvard University Press, 1968, pag. 10.
2. Geoffrey Wawro, A Mad Catastrophe. The Outbreak Of World War I And The Collapse of the Habsburg Empire, Basic Books, New York, 2014, pag. 36.
3. Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States, An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, Methuen-London, 1977, pag. 162.
4. Raymond Pearson, "Hungary. A state truncated, a nation dismembered", in Seamus Dunn and T.G. Fraser (eds.), Europe and Ethnicity. The First World War and contemporary ethnic conflict, Routledge, New York, 1996, pag. 88-89.
5. C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, 1790 - 1918, Faber&Faber, London, 2014, pp. 1149-1152.
6. Edward Crankshaw, The Fall of the House of Habsburg, Viking Press, New York, 1963, pag. 201-203.
7. Citate preluate de la Oscar Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1964, p. 321 si 309.
8. Paul (Pál) Lendvai, The Hungarians. A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2003, pag 17-18.
9. Robert William Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary, Archibald Constable &Co., Ltd, London, 1908, pag. 201.
10. Norman Stone, Hungary: A Short History, Profile Books, London, 2019, pag. 84.
11. Arthur J. May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1918, Norton Library / Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 440 si 444.
12. Oscar Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, The Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1964, pag. 441-442.
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Nu fiți supărat, toate bune !
Vezi că "in Romania le va lua locul doar cei 200.000 cei nascuti" nu e ok. Le vor lua locul, că sunt mai mulți...
Deficitul presupune o balanță, deci nu este al muncitorilor ci se referă la piața forței de muncă.
Așa că, din postura de corigent la limba română, de ce crezi că ar trebui sa-ți exhibi pe-aici micile idei și întrebări ??
De ce a ajuns România un sat fàrà câini ? De ce toate potàile de rang înalt de la Budapesta (Novak, Orban, Szijjarto) care vin la fiecare ocazie (15 martie, Sumuleu, Tusnad) sa schelàlaie pe aici nestingherite de ani de zile, mesaje antiromanesti, antieuropeene si mai nou proruse - umilind aceasta tara si acest popor in modul cel mai josnic posibil - au intrare liberà farà nicio problemà, farà a respecta uzantele si regulile diplomatice ?
Nu mai departe si ca fapt recent, dau ca exemplu cum presedintele Croatiei i-adat cu flit lui Vucic cand acesta a vrut sà viziteze, chipurile la modul privat, lagarul croat de la Jasenovac. De ce ? simplu si ca sa ne-ntelegem, la un asemenea rang si cand vii în vizità publicà oficiala sau oficioasà, nu existà "în privat".
Dacà madam Novak vrea sa vinà pentru mofetele din Covasna, ori musiu Orban la spa'ul din Tusnad, ori musiu Szijjarto sa deguste o palincà de Zetea , (fara acoperire media si informand totusi pe canalele diplomatice inainte, macar pentru a li se asigura un minim de securitate discreta), asta este cu totul altceva.
Se stie de fiecare data ca fiecare vizità a acestor personaje va degenera intr-un fel sau altul, sprijiniti în plus din interior de toata liota UDMR-ista care se gudurà la picioarele lor. Si atunci vin si và întreb domnilor guvernanti: DE CE ? Cum e posibil asa ceva domnilor Iohannis, Aurescu, Ciolacu (si toti ceilalti care v-ati perindat la putere în acesti ani) si de ce ati tolerat asa ceva ?
Veniti apoi vioi ca niste sifoniere, ficusi si alte plante de serà sà ne debitati niste declaratii alambicate si càldute, din care natul intelege doar ca ne-am luat-o iar în frezà de la mustàciosi si cà maimutele iar s-au cocotat pe coarnele boului fara nicio problemà ca sa-si facà circul în voie.
Dupà ultima vizità a lui tavarisci Orban la Tusnad, s-au îngrozit pânà si mass media si unele cercuri din afarà cum a fost posibil asa ceva si cum de tolereazà România asa ceva. Stimabili guvernanti vremelnici si impotenti, indiferent de contorsiunile la care sunteti supusi si toate pozitiile de kamasutra in care trebuie sa stati în fata celor de la Washington, Bruxelles sau Moscova, nu aveti nicio scuzà.
Luati taurul de coarne si rezolvati bàrbàteste problema odata pentru totdeauna. Pentru cà cu cât va fi mai târziu, cu atât consecintele vor fi mai complicate si dureroase. Sà nu và mirati cà Orban, Putin sau alti descreierati incep sa urce in sondajele de la noi; sa nu va mirati cà incà mai sunt multi care-l regretà pe impuscat, ori sà nu và mirati dacà în câtiva ani va apàrea o a 2 a capitalà a tinuturilor astea la Cluj ori la Targu Mures.
Neamul àsta e satul de slabiciune, dezorientare, incompetenta, umilintà, lipsà de viziune din partea guvernantilor; vrea sa fie condus si sa se simtà cat de cat în sigurantà cu voi la carmà pe coaja asta de nucà numità România. Nu vrea sefi frustrati, autosuficienti, ignoranti si plini de aer ca pufuletii , vrea lideri !
Cineva spunea cà nu se teme de un popor de lei condus de o oaie, ci de unul de oi condus de un leu. Dar la noi un popor de oi a nascut un guvern de lupi, spunea altcineva. Iar un popor de "plai cu boi" a nàscut monstrii, ca sà citez o fituicà odinioarà celebrà.
Problema principala e ca sub acoperisul "libertatii de exprimare " UE permite discursuri fasciste fara sa faca nimic , permite constituirea de partide fasciste cu toate ca al 2 lea razboi mondial de la asta a pornit , ura de rasa .
Daca ar fi numai Orban ar fi bine dar dupa cum vedem curentul nationalist prinde aripi , Italia cu Salvini si mai nou Meloni aflata pe primul loc , Spania cu Vox , daca nu era razboiul nici noi nu stateam prea rau in clasamentul tembelilor cu AUR , tot acest nationalism pare o reluare a anilor 30 care stim la ce a dus.
O distrugere a UE pe motive nationaliste va duce inevitabil la saracie si razboi.
Totuși e bine, ca el și cei ca el, în frunte cu stăpânul lor putelrica ne aduc aminte cum era “inainte” ca am impresia ca începusem sa uitam, de bine ce ne merge (Trump merita și el o mențiune in ceea ce privește a arata unde poate duce populismul).
Iar in Transilvania popularitatea lui este foarte mare prin prisma faptului ca a dat comunitatii maghiare un sens de apartenenta - cumparat sau mai putin prin pasapoartele in primul rand, investitiile din zona, readucerea aminte a perioadei de glorie de acum apropate 200 de ani - si o viziune pe termen lung. Ne place sau nu el este popular in Transilvania si va ramane popular. Indiferent de scopurile lui bune sau ele si indiferent ca ne place noua sau nu. el a reusit aceasta uniune a maghiarilor de pretutindeni. A incercat si Basescu ceva cu pasapoartele la moldoveni, dar pana la urma le-au luat etnicii rusi ca sa poata sa calatoreasca si sa munceasca in Vest. In rest, Si bineinteles cum sa reusesti in afara tarii, cand noi nu suntem in stare sa legam regiunile cu autostrazi - in afara de autostrada Cluburilor de Noapte de la Bucuresti la Constanta - prin urmare de ce ne plangem noi ca ungurii isi fac de cap in Transilvania atat timp cat noi nu suntem in stare sa aducem romanii la unison, dar sa mai si lucram impreuna cu etniile minoritare.
Asemenea declaratie de pe teritoriul Romaniei, de la un asemenea nivel, intr-un astfel de context - este o provocare. Si nu trebuie raspuns altfel decat prin pozitii diplomatice transante. Diplomatia sa primeze, oricat de provocatoare si la limita absurdului sunt declaratiile de acest gen.
Pentru ca tot a deschis dl Orban discutia aici, cred ca e momentul ca Romania sa prezinte cat mai amplu, cat mai vizibil, cu cat mai multi invitati specialisti, toate aceste noutati genetice. Dezbateri publice, carti, animatii, expozitii. Toate argumentele stiintifice care demonstreaza adevarul. Sa se mearga in profunzime cu tema. Ok, declaratii naziste. Sa fie sanatos. E ridicol. Iar noi refuzam sa ne intoarcem in trecut, la propagande stupide.
1. Ungaria are interesul național, strategic și istoric de a schimba granițele actuale, garantate de tratatele de pace încheiate după Al Doilea Război Mondial.
2. Leadershipul lui Orbán Viktor este primul de după revoluția maghiară de la 1956 care a găsit un context favorabil în care să acționeze pentru subminarea tratatelor de pace.
3. Strategia Ungariei este de a exacerba polarizările lumii actuale, împărțită între vechile modele ajunse la scadență (EOF) și noile modele, încă nevalidate. Ei pun paie pe foc în orice conflict global sau regional, cu scopul de a-l amplifica până când o modificare substanțială a status quo-ului va pune în discuție granițele actuale de interes pentru Ungaria.
4. România a ocupat în zonă locul de aliat strategic al USA în zonă - garantul vechii ordini. Ungaria a trebuit astfel să se alieze cu challengerii noii ordini- Rusia și China.
5. Ungaria nu dispune de o armată proprie suficient de puternică, iar în cazul unui conflict în care Ungaria ar ataca și nu s-ar apăra, nu toată populația ar fi gata de sacrificiu. De aceea, armata pe care Ungaria mizează să-i facă treaba este armata rusă.
6. În România, o parte a populației - în general simplă și foarte simplă din punct de vedere intelectual, admiră politica dictatorială a lui Putin și cea populistă a lui Orbán Viktor, tânjind la viață simplă sub un leader autoritar și în România. Această parte a populației, în general votantă PSD și AUR, formează un grup de idioți utili, ușor exploatabili de agenții Rusiei.
7. Ca urmare a compromiterii interesului național al României de către regimul Iliescu, prin ambiguitatea desprinderii de gorbaciovism din anii 1990 -1991, și a deprofesionalizării ulterioare a elitei prin incapacitatea de adaptare la noile modele, în ultimii 25-27 de ani, leadershipul României a dus o politică de delegare a suveranității naționale către USA și Israel și, în subteran, de disprețuire a Uniunii Europene. Băsescu, Traian, 2005: "mai bine o sug de la un singur licurici mare decât de la mai mulți licurici mai mici".
8. Astfel, dacă dorește păstrarea granițelor actuale, la momentul curent, România nu își permite o poziție proprie, fiind obligată să urmeze politica globală a USA, indiferent de orientarea leadershipului american - liberală sau conservatoare și fără a-și permite o politică proprie în relațiile cu Rusia și China.
9. Unei Ungarii mici și agile, cu greu de pedepsit pe față de către UE și numai blocată ocazional din subteran de establishmentul american, i se opune o Românie în care puterea aparține vârstei sociale 55+, orientată spre trecut, la care se adaugă o mulțime de idioți utili - cu intenții bune, dar fără capacitate de înțelegere și execuție, anchilozată de structuri de securitate în general neadaptate la realitate, sub un președinte incompetent și impotent, devenit un idiot util al serviciilor de securitate.
10. Trăgând linie, un meci care trebuia să fie închis în favoarea României încă înainte de a se juca, este acum deschis oricăru rezultat.